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I
INTRODUCTION
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is ....
If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on
the operation of each .... This is the very essence of judicial duty.'
The law is a sort of hocus-pocus science.2

Upon initial consideration, these two perspectives on the practice of judicial
interpretation seem to conflict. The recent literature on signaling games and the
canons of interpretation has shown that the duty of courts "to say what the law
is" and "hocus-pocus" are in fact quite consistent. The reason, of course, is that

judges operate in a context of significant uncertainty. They are uncertain about
two things: what the legislature said when it passed the law (what does the
language mean, if it means anything?) and what the legislature would say now
(are the coalitions or institutions responsible for motivating decisions different?).
This commentary addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the model utilized
and the conclusions reached by Schwartz, Spiller, and Urbiztondo in their
article.'
II
THE PROBLEM WITH SIGNALING GAMES

To analyze judicial interpretation, the article uses a method called the
signaling game, which combines recent advances in information theory with the
notion of sequential equilibrium. This technique has become common in
professional journals, and several other authors, including Spiller himself, have
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used it before to model judicial decisionmaking." The now-standard results,
known to most people who have followed the literature, are that "types" of
agents can be distinguished, or separated, by principals under two general classes
of circumstances. The "types" that may be important may have to do with
whether the agent is competent or incompetent, lazy or energetic, or (as in the
case of concern in the principle article), intensely interested or apathetic. The
two sets of conditions for useful equilibria are as follows.
First, it must be possible for explicit costs for misrepresenting type, known
to the agent ex ante, to be written into the contract or other formal relation
between actors. Second, the principal must be able credibly to threaten the
agent with the implicit ex post costs of misrepresenting type. The first approach
is difficult (that is, costly) because it requires close monitoring, exact definition
of task, and little scope for initiative by the agent. The second approach is
difficult because many threats to impose cost ex post are incredible. The
principal knows, and the agent knows the principal knows, that imposing costs
on the agent also imposes costs on the principal. Consequently, in equilibrium,
the threatened punishment is never meted out.
Unfortunately, this very interesting and important approach has become a bit
hackneyed. It seems that the signaling game theory is now used in many
circumstances because it is trendy and appears methodologically sophisticated,
rather than because it adds anything other than jargon and tedium to the
problem being analyzed. The "separating" and "pooling" equilibrium approach
is lifted and applied to new problems like a template, forcing new problems to
fit a particular, stylized set of assumptions.'
On first glance, the Schwartz, Spiller, and Urbiztondo article seems to be a
good target for these criticisms. Consider the assumptions required before the
authors can apply the signaling game/sequential equilibrium approach.
1. The principal, or at least the source of legislation with the power to
enforce its will, is "the" Congress. "It" is a unitary actor, and it has fixed
and well-defined transitive (in fact, linear!) preferences over outcomes.
2. The relevant policy space, for both Congress and the Supreme Court,
is unidimensional.
3. The choice set for Congress is binary: write specific legislation or
write vague legislation.
In addition, consider the first results generated by the approach. Well into
the article, after six lemmas, one proposition, and innumerable definitions of
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complex notation, the authors summarize the results of the article to that point:
"If there is signaling, then the signaling Congress must either care substantially
about the issue or must have low reversal costs."6 In other words, in order for
Congress to incur the costs of writing detailed legislation, it must either think the
issue is important or believe it can reverse the Court without much cost;
otherwise, all legislation would be vague. So far, all that the authors have
proved is that it is possible to take a well-known theorem from one setting, insert
words appropriate for the "new" problem being considered, and then show that
the theorem still holds.
III
THE POWER OF SIGNALING GAMES

However, labeling the principal article just another signaling game would be
quite wrong. There is more to the article for the patient reader, and it is a
significant advance in the literature. There are two separate results worthy of
the attention of scholars interested in judicial interpretation.
The first is the treatment of uncertainty. While the model is not complex, it
does account for uncertainty of both the Congress and the Supreme Court in far
more sophisticated a fashion than in any previous work. There are two sources
of uncertainty in the model: (1) Congress's uncertainty about its true reversal
costs, and (2) the Supreme Court's uncertainty about the true intensity of
preference of Congress. The first type of uncertainty allows the model to
incorporate changes in Congress resulting from election and retirement, and
forces an intertemporal perspective that is an accurate, yet elegant, representation of reality.
The second type of uncertainty captures the fundamental logic of the
signaling game in a way that most models pass over: The reason the Court reads
Congress's legislation carefully is not just to find the "plain meaning" of the
statute. Rather, the Court also reads the statute to find out what Congress will
do if the Court interprets the statute in a way Congress dislikes. This insight
provides interesting and unexpected explanations for the focus of the courts on
interpretation of statutes passed by legislatures. Most importantly, these insights
could not have been developed without the sophisticated and appropriately
abstract signaling model the authors have created.
The second major advance in the article is the substantive result in
Proposition 2.' This finding, once stated, is intuitive, but it is hardly obvious.
The result is that if the Court is certain about the preferences of Congress, there
will be no signaling and all legislation will be vague. Further, if there is great
uncertainty about the intensity of preference of Congress, no signaling will be
observed. Only if uncertainty is moderate is it sequentially rational for Congress
to write specific legislation. Nailing down these underlying conditions is exactly
6.
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the sort of approach required for the development of a useful formal literature
on the courts.
Again, this result suggests a variety of nonobvious questions with testable
implications. For example, does Congress ever find it in its interest to affect the
level of uncertainty of the Court? After all, if no signaling takes place, but
reversal costs are low, Congress will spend all its time rewriting existing (but
badly interpreted) statutes. What mechanisms has Congress evolved for solving
this problem? Likewise, the Supreme Court would prefer not to have all its
decisions reversed and the statutes rewritten; what mechanisms other than
interpreting legislation has the Court come up with for reducing its uncertainty
about reversal costs?
The real point, though it is beyond the scope of the Schwartz, Spiller, and
Urbiztondo article, is that nonsignaling equilibria where uncertainty is high are
not pareto optima.8 Even if the preferences of Congress and the Court diverge,
they may find it in their cooperative interest in some circumstances to reduce the
level of uncertainty the Court has about congressional preferences. This is an
entirely unexplored area of research, and Schwartz, Spiller, and Urbiztondo
should be congratulated for having pointed the way.

8. Pareto optima are outcomes upon which it is impossible to improve, without harming at least
one participant in the game. In this case, outcomes where Congress has legislated vaguely and then must
respond to judicial decisions that poorly interpret its statutes are not pareto optima.

